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The July 2004 Agriculture Framework is the basis for negotiations of modalities in agriculture in 
the WTO. The significant new ideas on domestic support include an Overall Reduction applying 
to the sum of Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Total AMS), de minimis AMSs, and blue 
box payments (i.e., all non-green support), tiered harmonizing reductions of overall distorting 
support and Total AMS, caps on product-specific AMSs, cap on and criteria for blue box 
payments, lower de minimis, and review of green box criteria. This paper assesses how several of 
these provisions might constrain the future (2014) distorting domestic support of USA, EU, 
Japan, Canada, Brazil, and China. Future support is projected, paying particular attention to U.S. 
and EU support. The analysis uses a hypothetical 90-80-70-60 reduction scenario to estimate the 
remaining entitlements to support and calculates the cuts the six Members can accommodate 
without affecting projected future support. It also estimates the maximum support that can be 
used within the commitments, considering that simply summing the Total AMS commitment and 
all de minimis allowances overestimates the amount of support that can be provided (a product’s 
AMS can not at the same time be de minimis and counted in Current Total AMS).  
 
The six Members can accommodate large cuts in commitments on overall distorting support and 
Total AMS. A cut of 75 percent would not bite into the U.S. future support and a 79 percent cut 
would not constrain future EU-15 support. Large cuts would not force the other four Members to 
reduce support from what they have notified or provided in recent years. Large cuts will prevent 
reversals of support reductions. Harmonizing tiered cuts can effectively address the support 
entitlements of the large subsidizers. Altogether the provisions of the 2004 Framework allow for 
substantial reductions in distorting support, and the Overall Reduction can be particularly 
effective. The reduction scenario examined for the six Members reduces their combined usable 
entitlements to all distorting support by about half (from $301 bill. in the base period to $148 bill. 
in 2014) when applied to Total AMS, de minimis, and blue entitlement separately. Applying also 
the Overall Reduction reduces the combined usable entitlements by a further $84 bill., bringing 
their allowed distorting support down to $65 bill. However, this requires that Members agree to 
sizeable percentage cuts in the commitments on Overall Reduction and on Total AMS.  
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The July 2004 Agriculture Framework articulates the basis for continued negotiations of full 
modalities in agriculture in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
1 Modalities are the rules and 
commitments governing Members’ decisions once a new WTO Agreement on Agriculture takes 
effect. The Framework addresses the three pillars of the existing Agreement on Agriculture 
(domestic support, market access, and export competition) and introduces other headings, such as 
least-developed countries, recently acceded Members, and monitoring and surveillance.  
 
The Framework resulted from the inputs of Members since the negotiations under the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) started in 2001. Proposals were submitted in 2002, draft modalities 
were presented by Ambassador Harbinson in March 2003, and several draft framework texts were 
prepared before or at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003.
2           
 
This paper examines the provisions of the July 2004 Framework concerning Overall Reduction 
and Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Total AMS) and assesses their effectiveness in 
constraining the future distorting domestic support of six Members: USA, EU, Japan, Canada, 
Brazil, and China. Assessing the effectiveness of the disciplines requires estimates of future 
support, and particular attention is given to estimating future U.S. and EU support. Several 
reduction scenarios are examined. The findings are expressed as the size of the percentage 




The Framework retains many of the concepts of the present Agreement on Agriculture, as 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round. There are also several new ideas of great significance. The 
following domestic support provisions remain from the present Agreement on Agriculture. 
                                                 
1 Early on 1 August 2004 in Geneva, negotiators agreed on a “Framework for Establishing Modalities in 
Agriculture”, which is Annex A of a decision of the General Council of the WTO, dated 2 August 2004 
(WTO 2004). The Framework, being part of this so-called “July package”, is often called the July 
Framework, the 2004 Framework, or the Agreed Framework. 
 
2 Brink (2004a) assesses the disciplines outlined in some of the 2002 proposals. Brink (2004b) assesses the 
disciplines outlined in the 2003 documents.   2
    Support in favour of agricultural producers is measured through AMS but support 
measures that meet the criteria of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (“green 
box”, i.e., not or at most minimally distorting) are excluded from AMS. 
 
    The commitment is taken on Total AMS, and certain AMS support is excluded from the 
calculation of Current Total AMS. The excluded AMS support is support that meets the 
criteria of Art. 6.2 (certain support in developing countries), Art. 6.4 (AMS amounts less 
than a certain percentage of value of production, i.e., “de minimis”), and Art. 6.5 (certain 
payments under production-limiting programs, i.e., “blue box”). 
 
    Special and differential provisions are available for developing countries. This includes 
longer implementation periods, lower reductions, and access to Art. 6.2. 
 
The significant new ideas on domestic support in the Framework include the following. 
 
    Overall reduction: commitment to provide no more than a given amount of distorting 
support of all kinds. The commitment applies to the sum of Current Total AMS, de 
minimis AMS amounts, and blue box payments.
3 It thus covers all domestic support that 
is not exempt as green box. It is here called Overall Distorting Support, or ODS, for ease 
of exposition. The commitment amount is arrived at by reducing a base amount of ODS. 
 
    The ODS reduction commitment includes a “first installment”: regardless of the size of 
the yearly reductions in the rest of the implementing period, the first year’s reduction will 
be a given 20 percent of the Base ODS for most Members. Even for those few Members 
whose historical blue box payments were greater than 5 percent of the sector’s value of 
production, the Base ODS for the first installment includes only the 5-percent amount, 
not the actual historical blue box payments. 
 
    The ODS reduction and the reduction in Total AMS will be of a harmonizing nature. This 
means that Members with larger entitlements to distorting support will carry out 
relatively larger reductions than other Members. Developed country Members will 
undertake “a strong element of harmonization” in reducing ODS and Total AMS. 
                                                 
3 The Framework is not clear on whether the overall commitment applies also to Art. 6.2 support of 
developing countries, although such support is not included in the overall base.   3
 
    The reductions will be carried out using a tiered approach. Each Member is placed in a 
particular category or tier, within which all Members undertake the same percentage 
reduction commitment. 
 
    There will be a cap on each product-specific AMS. A methodology will need to be agreed 
to establish these caps. 
 
    There will be a cap on blue box payments for all Members. This cap will be set at 5 
percent of the value of production of the agriculture sector in a historical period. 
 
    Existing and additional criteria will be negotiated to ensure that only payments that are 
less distorting than AMS measures will qualify for the blue box. 
 
    The  de minimis percentages will be reduced for all Members, whether developed or 
developing. Those developing countries that provide almost all their de minimis support 
to subsistence and resource-poor farmers need not reduce the de minimis percentage. 
 
    The criteria for the green box (Annex 2) will be reviewed and clarified to ensure that only 
measures with no or minimal distorting effects can qualify for the green box. 
 
    The monitoring and surveillance of the disciplines on domestic support will be enhanced, 




Outline of Analysis 
 
Negotiations under the Framework aim to achieve “substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support”, as required in the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001. Assessing the 
effectiveness of the provisions of the Framework thus requires estimating the size of the 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support that can be achieved through these provisions.  
   4
The analysis follows two approaches. One applies hypothetical reduction scenarios to estimate 
the remaining entitlements to distorting support for each of USA, EU, Japan, Canada, Brazil, and 
China. This approach also estimates the maximum amount of such support that can actually be 
used within the commitments and calculates how much it is reduced by the new commitments. 
The other approach projects each of the six Members’ support in the fairly distant future and 
calculates the reductions that the Member can take without affecting that projected future support. 
 
The Framework gives only very few numerical values. Assumptions are therefore needed for 
many key parameters.
4 For example, base periods will need to be chosen in order to measure the 
amounts to include in the base for the ODS reduction. This applies to the de minimis component 
and the blue box component, and the base periods for these two components need not be the 
same. Establishing base amounts is also difficult because the annual notifications of many 
Members are not up to date. Thus, even if a period had been set in the Framework, an absence of 






The de minimis component and (for most Members) the blue box component of the Base ODS are 
certain percentages of the value of production in the agriculture sector as a whole. The average 
value of production in 2000-02 is arbitrarily chosen to establish the de minimis and (except for the 
EU) the blue box component of the Base ODS.  
 
For the ODS reduction the analysis needs to assume the definition of tiers for the harmonizing 
reductions, the placement of each Member in a given tier, and the depth of cut in each tier. For 
the reduction of Total AMS the corresponding assumptions are needed. The Framework does not 
require the same tiers, placement in tiers, or depths of reduction for ODS and Total AMS. 
                                                 
4 The Framework gives numerical values of only two parameters: the cap on ODS after the first installment 
has been made (80% of the applicable base), and the cap on blue payments (5% of a value of production). 
   
5 The absence of notifications for recent years from many Members points up the importance of the 
Framework provisions for monitoring and surveillance, which will amend Article 18 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture to enhance monitoring through timely notifications. 
 
6 Blandford (2005) analyzes the Framework using notified data and discusses several provisions not 
examined in the present analysis (such as caps on product-specific AMSs, green box, and treatment of 
developing countries).    5
The analysis also needs assumptions about the reductions in de minimis (taken to mean reductions 
in the de minimis percentages from the 5 percent and 10 percent of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
and China’s 8.5 percent), and which, if any, of the six Members need not reduce de minimis. 
 
It is assumed that implementation of the new commitments under the DDA agreement on 
agriculture will start in 2008 and be completed in 2014, i.e., an implementing period of seven 
years. The actual end year of the implementing period is not critical to the analysis, only that it be 
far enough into the future to allow for a reasonable length of implementation (the Uruguay Round 
commitments were implemented over six years by developed and ten years by developing 
countries). While no differentiation between the implementing periods of developed and 
developing countries is assumed in this analysis, such differentiation will apply in reality, since 
the Framework stipulates longer implementation periods for developing countries. 
 
Assumptions are also needed about the value of production in 2014 of each of the six Members. 
This is because the 2014 value of production determines the de minimis allowances that will 
apply in that year. It is assumed that the present rules for de minimis exemption will apply in the 
DDA agreement on agriculture, although the de minimis percentages will in many cases be lower. 
 
The analysis establishes the 2014 end points of the reduction commitments and projects the 
support in 2014 without considering the time path through the implementing period. This 
simplifies the analysis, such as ignoring the role of the first installment of the ODS reduction. 
 
The data and methods for estimating base amounts and projections for 2014 are introduced in 
Annex A, with details shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The more specific procedures and data used for 
2014 estimates for USA and EU are introduced in Annex B, with details in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Although Members’ commitments are usually taken in their own currency (US$ for Brazil), this 
analysis also presents many amounts converted to U.S. dollars to facilitate comparisons.  
   
Overall (ODS) Reduction 
 
Nature of ODS Reduction 
 
The ODS reduction consists of reducing the Base ODS. The Base ODS is the sum of four 
components: (1) the Final Bound Total AMS commitment (in a Member’s Schedule of   6
commitments), (2) the entitlement to blue box payments (5 percent of the value of production in a 
particular period; blue payments in some period for the EU), (3) the sum of all product-specific 
de minimis allowances in a particular period (the sum of the value of production of all individual 
products is assumed to equal the value of production of the sector as a whole), and (4) the non-
product-specific de minimis allowance.
7 
 
The end point of the ODS reduction becomes the fixed ceiling commitment in 2014 for the sum 
of four components: (1) the 2014 Current Total AMS, (2) the 2014 blue box payments, (3) the 
sum of any product-specific AMS amounts exempted from Current Total AMS as de minimis in 
2014, and (4) the non-product-specific AMS if exempted as de minimis in 2014. 
 
Overall (ODS) Base 
 
The estimated amounts of Base ODS for the six Members are shown in Table 8 in the relevant 
currency and US$. Base ODS for each of USA, Japan, and Canada is the sum of the Final Bound 
Total AMS commitment and 15 percent of the agriculture value of production in 2000-02, the 
assumed base period. The 15 percent comprises 5 percent of value of production for product-
specific de minimis, 5 percent for non-product-specific de minimis, and 5 percent for blue box 
entitlement. The EU Base ODS consists of the Final Bound Total AMS commitment, 10 percent 
of value of production for the de minimis allowances, and the blue box payments made in 
2001-03 (assumed to be the “recent representative period” to be negotiated). 
  
The EU-15’s Final Bound Total AMS commitment of about $83 bill. (€67 bill.) is the highest 
among all WTO Members. It is almost twice as large as the $36 bill. commitment of Japan and 
more than four times larger than the $19 bill. commitment of USA. The EU-15 value of 
production in agriculture is the largest in the world, larger even than of China. The agriculture 
value of production in USA is the third largest in the world, followed by that of Japan and India. 
(See Annex A and Table 1 for Value of Production data). 
 
As a result of combining the very large Final Bound Total AMS commitment with a percentage 
of a very large agriculture value of production, and very large blue box payments, the EU-15 
Base ODS is considerably larger than the Base ODS of either USA or Japan. The Base ODS of 
USA and Japan are, however, considerably larger than those of Canada and Brazil.  
                                                 
7 Some may interpret the Framework’s “permitted de minimis level” differently.   7
The Base ODS of China is very large, in spite of China having a Total AMS commitment of zero. 
This results from China’s large agriculture value of production (approaching that of the EU-15), 
in combination with a de minimis percentage of 8.5 percent (i.e., larger than 5 percent) for each of 
the product-specific AMS amounts and for the non-product-specific AMS. While Brazil’s value 
of production is not among the largest in the world, and its Final Bound Total AMS commitment 
is relatively small, the de minimis percentage of 10 percent contributes to raising its Base ODS.  
 
An obvious tiering for ODS reduction thus results for developed countries, based on their 
absolute amount of Base ODS.
8 The EU is alone in a first tier, USA and Japan together in a 
second tier, and Canada in a third tier. Brazil as a developing country and China as a relatively 
recently acceded Member could be placed in a fourth tier. 
 
Tiered Harmonizing Overall reduction 
 
In order to illustrate the effects of a tiered harmonizing ODS reduction, percentage reductions 
need to be ascribed to each tier. This analysis uses a 90-80-70-60 scenario for this purpose (see 
Table 8). Other harmonizing reduction scenarios would be, for example, 95-85-75-65 or 75-67-
60-55 or 80-60-40-20. 
 
The 90-80-70-60 scenario means that the top tier (EU) would commit to a ceiling on ODS at the 
end of the implementing period equal to 10 percent of its Base ODS. USA and Japan would in 
this scenario commit to ceilings equal to 20 percent of their respective Base ODS. Canada, in the 
third tier, would commit to a ceiling of 30 percent. Brazil and China, one a developing country 
and the other a relatively recently acceded Member, would reduce the Base ODS by 60 percent 
and commit to a ceiling of 40 percent of the Base ODS base at the end of their implementing 
period (the implementing period is assumed in this illustration to be the same for all Members). 
The harmonizing effect of this scenario is seen by comparing the EU and U.S. Base ODS and the 
resulting ceiling commitments on ODS (Table 8). The EU Base of $142 bill. is about three times 
larger than the U.S. base of $48 bill. After the 90 and 80 percent reductions, respectively, the EU 
commitment of $14 bill. on ODS is only 1.4 times larger than the U.S. commitment of $10 bill.  
 
                                                 
8 Some argue that the placement in tiers should be based on the size of Base ODS in relation to the value of 
production (i.e., relative size of Base ODS). For the four developed country Members in this analysis, such 
an approach would under most assumptions result in the same placement as an absolute-based approach. A 
small developed country with a relatively large Total AMS commitment could be placed differently.         8
As a result of having the second highest Base ODS, combined with a reduction of only 60 
percent, China would in this illustrative scenario obtain as large a ceiling commitment on ODS as 
$25 bill. This is two-and-a-half times larger than the commitment of either USA or Japan and 
almost twice as large as the ceiling commitment of the EU-15. 
 
Total AMS Reduction 
 
Nature of Total AMS Reduction 
 
The reduction of Total AMS need not use the same number of tiers or the same rules to place 
Members in tiers as the ODS reduction. However, this analysis does assume that developed 
countries fall in one of three tiers also for Total AMS reductions, based on the absolute amount of 
the Final Bound Total AMS, and developing countries are placed in a fourth tier. China has no 
Final Bound Total AMS to reduce and is not placed in any tier. 
 
The bases for the Total AMS reductions are shown in Table 9. These are the Final Bound Total 
AMS commitments from Members’ Schedules. 
 
Tiered Harmonizing Total AMS Reductions 
 
For the Total AMS reductions, the same harmonizing scenario is assumed as for the ODS 
reduction, i.e., 90-80-70-60. The assumption of identical reductions for ODS and Total AMS 
simplifies the exposition of the scenarios. However, there are good reasons why the ODS 
reduction should be a larger percentage than the Total AMS reduction. This is because the Base 
ODS in reality will have even more slack built in than the Final Bound Total AMS. Current Total 
AMS amounts fall at least somewhat short, and in some cases much short, of the Final Bound 
Total AMS. This slack will be present also in the commitment on ODS. In addition some more 
slack is built in because no Member is using the de minimis and blue box allowances to their 
maximum, in spite of such allowances in their entirety being included in the Base ODS. 
 
The harmonizing feature of the assumed reduction scenario is equally apparent for the Total AMS 
commitments as for the commitments on ODS (Table 9). The Total AMS commitment for the EU 
would be $8.3 bill. under its 90 percent reduction. This is only slightly more than twice as large   9
as the U.S. commitment, resulting from a 80 percent reduction. (The EU base was more than four 
times larger than the U.S. base).  
 
Estimating Possible Reductions 
 
Projecting Distorting Support in 2014 
 
A second approach to analyzing the disciplines on trade-distorting domestic support consists of 
projecting the amounts of support subject to each commitment at the end of the implementing 
period, i.e., in 2014. Comparing these 2014 amounts of Current ODS and Current Total AMS to 
the Base ODS and the Final Bound Total AMS indicates how large a reduction can be taken 
without forcing a reduction in the support the Member is projected to otherwise provide in 2014. 
 
The composition and levels of distorting support in 2014 are projected as a continuation of recent 
notified support. It is assumed, however, that the de minimis percentages in 2014 will be half of 
the present percentage (not for China), possibly moving some AMS amounts into 2014 Current 
Total AMS. The validity of such projections is reduced because the underlying notifications may 
refer to years as long ago as 1997/98, as in the case of Brazil. Separate projections are therefore 
made for USA and the EU, two Members with large entitlements who also have notified large 
amounts of distorting support in recent years.  
 
USA: Projecting 2014 Support 
 
In USA major policy adjustments tend to be introduced with intervals of about 5 to 7 years. The 
2002 farm legislation instituted two payment programs that are expected not to be claimed as 
exempt from Current Total AMS on green box grounds, viz., Counter-Cyclical payments (CCP) 
and marketing loan programs (mainly Loan Deficiency Payments, LDP).
9 It is assumed that these 
two price-related payment programs will remain in 2014. In fact, it is assumed that the farm law 
of 2007 will retain the same structure of support as the 2002 law. Very little information is 
available that would support other assumptions about the structure of U.S. policy support in 2014. 
 
The CCP and LDP payments have fluctuated considerably in the first few years since 2002, 
mainly as a result of different price changes for different crops. Large payments were made for 
                                                 
9 Other elements of the marketing loans program are marketing loan gains and certificate exchange gains.   10
wheat and corn for the 2004/05 crop year, when market prices were low. For 2014 the baseline 
projections of the U.S. Department of Agriculture indicate higher prices for major crops than in 
2004. Consequently the price-related payments (i.e., CCP and LDP) are projected to be much 
smaller in 2014 than in 2004. At the same time, such projections can not represent the unknown 
shocks likely to affect market prices in 2014. Lower-than-projected prices in 2014, whatever the 
reason, would generate larger CCP and LDP payments under the assumed continuation of the 
2002 legislation. No such “spike” in the CCP is assumed here. A reduction of the “loan rates” set 
by policy might reduce the amount of LDP payments and increase the amount of CCP payments. 
 
While support measures under the 2002 farm legislation have not yet (May 2005) been notified to 
the WTO, it is widely assumed that USA will classify LDP as product-specific AMS support and 
CCP as non-product-specific AMS support (See Annex B for details of the 2014 projection.) 
 
EU: Projecting 2014 Support 
 
The EU made several policy decisions in 2003 and 2004 that changed key policy parameters. The 
changed parameters are assumed to apply in 2014. This concerns several product sectors that 
account for a large part of notified EU support, such as dairy, rice, tobacco, cotton, and olive oil. 
Additional decisions are expected for sugar. Reform of the fruit, vegetable and wine sectors has 
also been mentioned, but no such reform is assumed in this analysis. The 2003 and 2004 policy 
decisions reduced much of the future AMS support and blue box payments and increased the 
payments expected to be claimed as green. For example, sizeable reductions of market price 
support to beef, butter, skim milk powder, and sugar result from lower regulated prices. 
Intervention buying of rice and butter will be eliminated or capped. Payments classified as AMS 
support for olive oil, tobacco, and cotton will be reduced significantly. (See Annex B for details.) 
 
Other Members: Projecting 2014 Support 
 
Brazil. Since Brazil has not notified for a recent year, it is assumed that Brazil will in 2014 
provide the same amount of trade-distorting domestic support as in 1997/98. This amount is low, 
both in relation to Brazil’s Total AMS commitment and to the size of Brazil’s agriculture sector. 
 
Canada. Canada’s latest notification is for 2000, showing a Current Total AMS that is low in 
relation to both Canada’s Total AMS commitment and to the size of its agriculture sector.   11
However, the need to address back-to-back droughts in 2002 and 2003 and the effects of 
discovering BSE in 2003 and 2004 has increased the Current Total AMS in those years. This will 
need to be taken into account when comparing the base amounts to the projected 2014 amounts. 
The issue is essentially whether Canada’s 2014 support will be similar to its 2000 support (known 
from notification), similar to its 2004 support (possibly inferred from 2003 and 2004 support 
policy decisions), or something else. 
 
Japan. Japan has uniformly reduced or abolished the support prices used in the market price 
support it reports in yearly notifications. The increases in payments are smaller than the 
reductions in market price support, resulting in slowly declining Current Total AMS. It is 
assumed here that this trend will be continued. 
 
China. China has not notified any domestic support since its accession to the WTO in 2001. 
While it is known that some kinds of support have been increased recently, China is committed 
not to exceed its de minimis allowances on AMS support. The 1996-98 levels of support are 
assumed to be provided in 2014, well below even half of the present de minimis thresholds. 
 
The Possible Percentage Reductions 
 
The estimated 2014 Current ODS and the 2014 Current Total AMS are expressed as percentages 
of their respective bases in Table 10.
10  
 
The 2014 Current ODS in USA would correspond to 25 percent of the Base ODS. The 
corresponding percentage for the EU would be 21 percent. USA would thus be able to commit to 
reducing ODS by 75 percent, without needing to reduce the support that is projected to be 
provided if the 2002 farm legislation continues to apply in 2014.
11 Such a reduction commitment 
would, however, make it impossible for USA to increase payments in 2014 in response to a price 
                                                 
10 “Current ODS” (Overall Distorting Support) is not defined in the Framework. Future monitoring of 
Members’ implementation of their commitments on overall support will require notification of such a 
variable. It would parallel the Current Total AMS, which is defined in the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Current ODS would exempt neither blue box payments nor de minimis AMS amounts nor, perhaps, certain 
support in developing countries. 
 
11 The size of the possible reduction may be underestimated by a few percentage points. The 2014 
projection of CCP ($1.8 bill.) uses the USDA Baseline projection of February 2004. The fiscal year 2006 
President’s Budget of February 2005 indicates a much lower 2014 CCP projection ($0.5 bill.).     
   12
drop. The reduction commitment would prevent a repetition of the increase in price-related 
payments seen in response to the 2004 price decline. 
 
The EU would be able to commit to reducing ODS by 79 percent and still be able to provide the 
distorting support in 2014 that is projected to remain after the CAP reforms decided and proposed 
in 2003 and 2004. Such a reduction commitment would, however, prevent a reversal of these 
policy reforms to the pattern of support seen in the late 1990s. 
 
Similarly, USA could commit to reducing Total AMS by 60 percent without impairing its ability 
to grant support in 2014 according to the provisions of the 2002 farm law (Table 10). The EU 
could commit to reducing Total AMS by 70 percent without constraining its capacity to provide 
support in accordance with the full implementation of 2003 and 2004 CAP reforms. 
 
Interpreting Table 10 in the same way for the other Members gives equally forceful findings.  
 
    Japan would be able to reduce ODS and Total AMS commitments by, respectively, 84 
percent and 82 percent while providing the same amounts of support as in 2001.  
 
    Canada seems to have considerable room below its bases (possible cuts in both ODS and 
Total AMS commitments by 80 and 75 percent, respectively). However, this assumes a 
continuation of the same amounts of distorting support as in 2000. In more recent years 
non-green support in Canada has been higher than in 2000 as a result of back-to-back 
droughts and BSE outbreaks. The reductions that would be possible without reducing 
support below that of recent years would thus be smaller than shown in Table 10.  
 
    Brazil would be able to reduce ODS and Total AMS commitments by 95 percent and 91 
percent, respectively, and then provide the same amounts of support as in 1997/98. If 
distorting support has been increased in Brazil since 1997/98, the possible percentage 
reductions could be smaller. However, the value of production in Brazil is assumed to 
increase rapidly. This raises Brazil’s de minimis allowance, making it possible to provide 
an increasing amount of AMS support within a given commitment on Total AMS. 
 
    China would be able to reduce its commitment on ODS by 94 percent and still provide as 
much distorting support as in 1996-98. China’s policy support to farmers is now   13
increasing rapidly, but it is not clear how this might be represented in its measurement of 
ODS (e.g., some of the increase is in the form of tax reductions and some of it may be 
green). However, China would be able to take a large percentage cut in its commitment 




Some uncertainties attach to these findings. The March 2005 outcome of the WTO dispute on 
U.S. cotton disqualifies certain U.S. payments from the green box. If these payments without 
policy change continue in 2014, they need to be included in Current ODS and possibly Current 
Total AMS of USA. The percentage reductions indicated above would make such a shift from 
green to non-green classification impossible. Similar issues might arise with the EU Single Farm 
Payment. Reductions of the size indicated here would effectively reduce U.S. and EU distorting 
support below what could otherwise have been provided in 2014. On the other hand, if the policy 
measures found or thought to be non-green were to be changed so they meet the green box 
criteria, the above percentage reductions would only lock in the present support pattern. 
 
EU CAP reform along the lines of the 2003 and 2004 reforms has not been assumed for the fruit, 
vegetable and wine sectors by 2014, although Commissioners have mentioned such reforms. If 
support policy for these sectors were to be changed, the EU-15 Current ODS and Current Total 
AMS in 2014 might be, say, €6 bill. lower. This would allow EU-15 reductions to be several 
percentage points larger than shown above, without biting into projected actual distorting support. 
Exploratory comparisons suggest that the conclusions would be largely similar if data had been 
developed for EU-25 instead of EU-15. The 2005 EU-25 Total AMS commitment is unknown.  
 
Estimating the Effective Reduction in Distorting Domestic Support 
 
Constraining ODS vs. Constraining Separate Components of Distorting Support  
 
Experience with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture shows that, while Total AMS 
commitments were reduced, many Members exempt significant amounts of distorting support 
from commitment as blue, de minimis, and Art. 6.2 support. The Framework requirement to 
reduce ODS allows no exemptions from the commitment and has the potential to constrain more   14
effectively the amount of distorting support. The Final Bound commitment on ODS indicates the 
size of each Member’s entitlement to distorting support at the end of DDA implementation. 
 
The constraints on the individual components of distorting domestic support will work in parallel 
with the ODS reduction commitment. They include the reduction in the Total AMS commitment 
and the reduction in de minimis percentages. The cap on blue payments will also, for the EU, 
reduce that component of distorting support. Comparing the sum of reduced support that can be 
provided under each component with the reduced commitment on ODS will indicate how much 
more the reduction commitment on ODS constrains distorting support, beyond what is achieved 
by the combination of constraints on the individual components. 
 
Measuring the Sum of the Components of Distorting Support  
 
The future entitlement to distorting support, without exemptions, is given by the 2014 ODS caps 
(Table 8). The calculation of the sum of entitlements to such support under each component 
(Total AMS, de minimis, and blue) is complicated by the interaction between the de minimis rules 
and Current Total AMS. Simply summing the Total AMS commitment, the non-product-specific 
de minimis allowance, and the sum of product-specific de minimis allowances overestimates the 
amount of distorting support that can actually be provided. The overestimation results from the 
fact that the AMS for a given product can not at the same time be exempt as de minimis and be 
counted in Current Total AMS.
12  
 
The interaction between de minimis and Current Total AMS is therefore assumed to be managed 
as follows: (1) Current Total AMS equals the Total AMS commitment, (2) non-product-specific 
                                                 
12 The composition of a Member’s future Current ODS is likely to differ from the composition of its Base 
ODS as per the Framework. The Base ODS adds entitlements (Final Bound Total AMS and permitted de 
minimis level), whether they were used in the base period or not. In the future, product A’s AMS will be, 
depending on its size, either (i) smaller than product A’s de minimis allowance (which depends on product 
A’s future value of production and the de minimis percentage) and thus not part of Current Total AMS, or 
(ii) larger than product A’s de minimis allowance and thus part of Current Total AMS. A product’s AMS 
cannot at the same time be both de minimis and part of Current Total AMS. It must be one or the either. 
Since the calculation of Base ODS uses entitlements, not actual historical product-specific AMS amounts, 
the either-or status does not affect the Base ODS amount. Roberts (2005) and others have suggested that 
the Base ODS be set by reducing the amount, calculated in accordance with the Framework, by some 
amount based on historical notifications (such as the sum of the unused de minimis allowances for products 
whose AMS amounts contribute to the base period Current Total AMS). This would establish future 
commitments partly on the basis of past “applied” support, in addition to the Framework procedure of using 
only existing commitment and entitlements calculated from the base period value of production. It rewards 
a Member whose historical Current Total AMS of $X derives from only a few product AMSs and penalizes 
a Member whose historical Current Total AMS of the same $X derives from many product AMSs.    15
AMS equals the non-product-specific de minimis allowance, (3) product-specific AMS amounts 
for products accounting for a given share of the sector’s value of production are all equal to each 
product’s de minimis allowance, and (4) product-specific AMS amounts for products accounting 
for the other share of the sector’s value of production make up the Current Total AMS. This 
“perfect management” of the entitlements to distorting support allows the calculation of 
maximum AMS support. This amount indicates, under the given assumptions, the maximum sum 
of Current Total AMS and de minimis exemptions that can be achieved in practice. 
 
Adding the blue box entitlement (5 percent of value of production in 2000-02) and the maximum 
AMS support yields the Maximum Distorting Support (MDS) the Member can provide under 
“perfect management”.
13 If MDS is less than the reduced commitment on ODS, MDS is the 
effective limit on distorting support (expressed differently, the reduction in ODS commitment is 
not large enough to make a difference).
14 On the other hand, if MDS is larger than the reduced 
commitment on ODS, it is the ODS commitment that is effective in reducing distorting support.     
 
MDS in this analysis is calculated as a sum of components: 
Maximum Distorting Support  = 
   
    Total AMS commitment + 
   
  +  blue box commitment (i.e., 5% of the sector’s historical value of production) +  
   
 +  product-specific  de minimis allowances for products accounting for an arbitrary 
50% of the sector’s current value of production (100% for China)
15 + 
   
 +  non-product-specific  de minimis allowance 
 
The 50 percent of the sector’s current value of production is an arbitrary choice. It is not possible 
to predict whether a Member in 2014 will concentrate its AMS support on a few products (thus 
                                                 
13 Brink (2004a and 2004b) uses MDS to evaluate the support entitlements resulting from provisions 
introduced earlier in the negotiations. 
 
14 Interestingly, in this case the Member will not be able to provide as much distorting support as indicated 
by the ODS commitment. The Maximum Distorting Support (MDS) falls short of the ODS commitment by 
the sum of the unusable product-specific AMS de minimis allowances. 
 
15 China’s Total AMS commitment is zero and Current Total AMS can only be zero. The either-or situation 
for product-specific AMS amounts does therefore not arise, and MDS equals the ODS commitment.   16
forgoing de minimis exemptions on these few products) or distribute its AMS support over many 
or all products in such small and managed amounts that all the de minimis allowances are used.
16 
 
Effectiveness of Constraining ODS vs. Constraining Components 
 
The reduction commitment on ODS, at the reduction percentages assumed in this analysis, 
constrains distorting support to a significantly lower amount than the corresponding sum of the 
components of distorting support (i.e., where each component is assumed to be constrained 
according to the same scenario as the reduction commitment on ODS). (See Table 11).  
 
For example, consider the USA. The U.S. Base ODS is $48 bill. and the Base MDS is $43 bill.
17 
The 80 percent ODS reduction assumed for USA brings the 2014 ODS commitment to $10 bill. 
(a reduction by about $39 bill. from $48 bill.). Among the components of distorting support, 
Total AMS is reduced also by 80 percent, the de minimis percentages are cut by half, and the cap 
on blue is fixed. The sum of these constrained components, i.e., the 2014 MDS, is $22 bill. This 
is a reduction of only about $21 bill., or 49 percent, from the Base MDS of $43 bill.  
 
However, the sum of distorting support, whether Current Total AMS, de minimis, or blue, cannot 
exceed the ODS commitment of $10 bill. in 2014. The $10 bill. is the effective constraint on the 
sum of the components, since it is smaller than the $22 bill. sum of the constraints on the 
components. The ODS reduction commitment effectively reduces the 2014 MDS by a further $12 
bill. (29 percentage points) below the sum of what would have been allowed under the constraints 
on the individual components of distorting support (Total AMS, de minimis, and blue).  
 
For the other five Members, the additional reduction in distorting support resulting from the ODS 
reduction ranges from 9 to 69 percentage points. In total for the six Members, the allowed 
distorting support is reduced by a further 28 percentage points below what would have been 
allowed without the ODS reduction commitment. The combination of reducing Total AMS, 
                                                 
 
16 E.g., the EU notified larger than de minimis AMS on products making up 48% of the sector’s value of 
production in 2000, and USA on products making up 32% of the sector’s value of production in 2001. 
There is no basis for assuming that these particular percentages will apply also in 2014. 
 
17 The difference between Base ODS and Base MDS is the sum of product-specific de minimis allowances 
on products accounting for half of the sector’s value of production, i.e., 5% of about $100 bill. 
   17
reducing de minimis percentages, and capping blue reduces the usable entitlements to distorting 
support (i.e., MDS) from $301 bill. to $148 bill., a reduction by $152 bill. The ODS reductions, 
according to the 90-80-70-60 reduction scenario, achieve a further cut of $84 bill. in the 
entitlements to distorting support. This is evidence that the ODS reduction commitment, with a 
large enough percentage reduction, is a powerful instrument in shrinking the entitlements to 
distorting support to less than would be allowed after reducing separately the Total AMS by the 
same percentage, halving the de minimis percentages and capping blue.




The projections of support into the future (2014) indicates that the six Members (USA, EU, 
Japan, Canada, Brazil, China) can accommodate forceful percentage cuts in commitments on 
Overall Reduction (ODS) and on Total AMS. A 75 percent cut would not bite into the amounts of 
2014 support that USA is projected to provide under continued policy. A 79 percent cut would 
not constrain the support that the EU is projected to provide in 2014 under known policy changes. 
Nor would large cuts in commitments force other Members to reduce distorting support from 
what they have provided in recent years (Japan, Canada, Brazil, China). Large cuts will, however, 
prevent reversals of policy. For example, USA and the EU would not be able to raise the amounts 
of distorting support to the levels seen in recent years. 
 
The analysis also shows that harmonizing tiered cuts can effectively address the entitlement to 
distorting support of the large subsidizers. A large part of the reduction in distorting support is of 
course accounted for by the policy changes already decided or proposed by the EU (the analysis 
assumes that the Single Farm Payment qualifies as green box support). However, by committing 
to sufficiently large reductions in distorting support, the EU would lock in these reforms. 
Altogether the provisions of the 2004 Framework can allow for substantial reductions in 
distorting domestic support. This is especially the case for the Overall Reduction of all distorting 
                                                 
18 Intuitively this outcome is explained as follows. The ODS reduction reduces all entitlements to distorting 
support, without exceptions, by 90 percent (or 80 or 70 or 60 percent, depending on the Member and the 
scenario). The corresponding constraints on the components impose the 90 percent reduction only on Total 
AMS, while the exemptions from Total AMS are not reduced at all (blue box, for most Members) or only 
by 50 percent (the percentages that determine the de minimis allowances, for many Members). Even with as 
low a reduction in ODS and Total AMS as 50 percent, the ODS commitment is the binding constraint, 
since only two of the elements (Total AMS and de minimis allowances) are cut by half, while the blue 
entitlement is not reduced (this does not hold for the EU, whose Base ODS includes a large amount of 
historical blue payments). This generalization is based crucially on the assumptions that the percentage 
reductions in ODS and Total AMS are equal and that the de minimis percentages are cut in half.    18
support. The reduction scenario examined for six Members reduces their combined usable 
entitlements to all distorting support by about half (from $301 bill. in the base period to $148 bill. 
in 2014) when applied to Total AMS, de minimis, and blue entitlement separately. Applying also 
the Overall Reduction reduces the combined usable entitlements of these six Members by a 
further $84 bill., bringing their allowed distorting support down to $65 bill. This is about 20 
percent of their base period entitlement. However, this requires that Members agree to sizeable 
percentage cuts in the commitments on Overall Reduction and on Total AMS (a 90-80-70-60 
scenario was examined here). A deep Overall Reduction effectively reduces the entitlements to 
distorting support to smaller amounts than would be allowed under separate reductions in the 
Total AMS commitment and de minimis percentages and the cap on blue. 
 
The Framework thus has the potential to allow the negotiation of “substantial reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support”, as called for in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Delivering on this 
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Annex A: Data for Estimating Base Amounts and Projecting to 2014 (Tables 1, 2 and 3)  
 
Estimates of some support components (blue payments) and value of production, along with data 
on commitments and de minimis percentages, underlie the establishment of base amounts for the 
2000-02 period assumed in this analysis. Estimates of the corresponding variables for 2014 are 
also derived. Exchange rates are needed for the expression of key variables in the common 
currency of U.S. dollars to facilitate comparisons. The data sources are briefly introduced below. 
Table 1 gives the detailed data. Table 2 uses this data to calculate Base ODS, calculate the ODS 
reduction scenario, and project 2014 ODS. Table 3 uses the data to calculate Base MDS and 
project 2014 MDS. Most results are expressed in considerably rounded form, since reasonable 
assumptions and results are at least as important in this analysis as high precision.   
 
Value of production. For 2000, 2001, and 2002, from domestic support notifications, OECD 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) data base, and national statistics. For 2004, from national 
projections or assumptions about change from 2000-02. For 2014, from assumed growth rates 
from 2000-02 or 2004. 
 
De minimis percentages. For 2000-02, from the Agreement on Agriculture (5%: USA, EU, Japan, 
Canada; 10%: Brazil) and WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3 (8.5%: China). 
 
Exchange rates. Mid-market exchange rate observed between local currency and U.S. dollar on 
October 6, 2004. Source: http://www.xe.com/ucc/ 
 
 
Annex B. Details of 2014 Support Estimates for USA and EU-15 (Tables 4, 5, 6, 7) 
 
The estimates of support in 2014 are presented in depth for USA and the EU-15, given the large 
amounts of the support involved. Product-specific detail of Current Total AMS for USA is shown 
in Table 4 and for EU-15 in Table 5. The projected AMS amounts for the major products making 
up the 2014 projection of Current Total AMS are shown in Table 6. The calculations of the base 
amounts, 2014 support and the possible cuts are shown in Table 7. 
 
USA   20
The data underlying the U.S. Current Total AMS has been notified for 2000 and 2001. Table 6 
uses this data in summarized form along with corresponding data for 2004 and 2014. The 
projections are based mainly on the USDA Baseline of February 2004. The price gaps for market 
price support estimates are based on assumed unchanging administered prices from 2004 under 
the 2002 Farm Bill and are multiplied by the projected 2014 production. The payment support in 
2014 is assumed to comprise mainly loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains as 
projected in the USDA 2004 Baseline. The 2014 de minimis thresholds are based on value of 
production projections from the USDA 2004 Baseline, using an assumed percentage of 2.5%. 
 
Counter-Cyclical Payments in 2014 are assumed not to be part of Current Total AMS, either 
because they might be claimed as blue or claimed as non-product-specific AMS, which would be 
de minimis (any justification for either claim is not clear). It is also assumed that Direct Payments 





The projection of 2014 support assumes that EU policy, as changed under Agenda 2000, will 
remain in effect in 2014, unless changed by the 2003 and 2004 CAP reforms (the latest 
notification is for 2001/02). The 2003 and 2004 changes are assumed to remain in effect in 2014 
(mainly dairy, rice, tobacco, cotton, and olive oil). Some changes involve reducing or eliminating 
intervention prices or capping intervention quantities. Sugar policy is assumed to change along 
the lines of the early 2004 EC proposal. These and other changes may, depending on the 
interpretation of many details, enable the EU-15 to calculate a much smaller Current Total AMS 
in 2014 than in recent years. While market oriented reforms of the fruit, vegetable and wine 
sectors are possible, no such reforms are assumed here.  
 
A large part of recent payments notified as blue is assumed to be claimed as green in the future, 
being part of the Single Farm Payment (SFP). The future amount that is assumed to be claimed as 
blue is thus much smaller than recent notified blue payments.  
Table 1. Data for Estimating Key Variables and Reduction Scenario on Total AMS
A. Exchange rate  not appl.  0.8126 EUR/USD 111.273 JPY/USD 1.2587 CAD/USD not appl. 8.2768 CNY/USD
US$ bill.  € bill. ¥ bill. C$ bill.  US$ bill. IBGE data: RMB bill.
B. Value of production  agr GDP/XR
2000  189.5 USA/51  243.4 EEC/49 9,122.4 JPN/98 31.7 CAN/53 42.8 78.3/1.831
2001  198.5 USA/51  251.2 97.2% of 3.1.5 8,881.3 JPN/108 34.2 author est. 37.9 89.3/2.3531 2,338.6 ChNatBurStats
2002  194.0 USDA B.line  245.8 97.2% of 3.1.5 8,929.7 JPN/108 33.1 author est. 35.9 104.9/2.9235
average 2000-02  194.0  246.8 8,977.8 33.0  38.9 2,338.6
2004  206.9 USDA B.line  246.8 same as 00-02 8,798.2 98% of 00-02 33.0 same as 00-02 38.9 same as 00-02
Growth percent.  not appl. 10% calculated 0.05 half of US growth -0.15 -1.5% /year 0.10 same as USA 0.20 twice USA 0.12 assumed
2014  227.5 USDA B. line  259.1 7,478.5 36.3  46.6 2,619.2
227.5 US$ bill.  318.9 US$ bill. 67.2 US$ bill. 28.9 US$ bill. 46.6 US$ bill. 316.5
C. De minimis   thresholds based on estimated 2000-02 VOP
10% of VOP  19.4  24.7 897.8 3.3  3.9
5% of VOP  9.7  12.3 448.9 1.7  1.9 198.8 8.5% of VOP
D. De minimis   thresholds based on estimated 2014 VOP
10% of VOP  22.7  25.9 747.9 3.6  4.7
5% of VOP  11.4  13.0 373.9 1.8  2.3 222.6 8.5% of VOP
2.5% of VOP  5.7  6.5 187.0 0.9  1.2
8.5% of VOP 
E. Blue box entitlement fixed 2007-14 (based on value of production in assumed base period 2000-02) 
5% of VOP  9.7  12.3 448.9 1.7  1.9 116.9
F. Estimated "existing blue box payments" 
2001  0.0 USA/51  23.5 OECD PSE 91.1 JPN/108 0.0  0.0 0.0
2002  0.0 ass. no blue  21.5 OECD PSE 86.5 JPN/108 0.0  0.0 0.0
2003  0.0 ass. no blue  24.3 OECD PSE 90.0 assumed 0.0  0.0 0.0
2001-03  23.1 89.2
G. Base Total AMS (Final Bound Total AMS commitment from Uruguay Round Schedules)
2000 or 2004  19.1  67.2 3,972.9 4.3  0.9 0.0
19.1 US$ bill.  82.6 US$ bill. 35.7 US$ bill. 3.4 US$ bill. 0.9 US$ bill. 0.0 US$ bill.
H. Reduction scenario on Total AMS commitment: (90-80-70) USA 80% EU 90% Japan 80% Canada 70% Brazil 60%
3.8 20% left  6.7 10% left 794.6 20% left 1.3 30% left 0.4 40% left 0.0 not appl.
3.8 US$ bill.  8.3 US$ bill. 7.1 US$ bill. 1.0 US$ bill. 0.4 US$ bill.
Brazil China USA  EU-15 Japan Canada  22
 
Table 2. Base Data for ODS, Reduction Scenario on ODS, and Projecting 2014 ODS
A. Exchange rate  not appl.  0.8126 EUR/USD 111.273 JPY/USD 1.2587 CAD/USD not appl. 8.2768 CNY/USD
US$ bill.  € bill. ¥ bill. C$ bill.  US$ bill. RMB bill.
I. Base ODS (Overall Distorting Support) 
Final Bound Total AMS  19.1  67.2 3,972.9 4.3  0.9 0.0
Blue box component  9.7 5%VOP 00-02 23.1 pymts2001-03 448.9 5%VOP 00-02 1.7 5%VOP 00-02 1.9 5%VOP 00-02 116.9 5%VOP 00-02
PS   dm   (ass. 2000-02)  9.7 5%  12.3 5% 448.9 5% 1.7 5%  3.3 10% 198.8 8.5%
NPS   dm   (ass.2000-02)  9.7 5%  12.3 5% 448.9 5% 1.7 5%  3.3 10% 198.8 8.5%
    Base ODS (sum above)  48.2  115.0 5,319.6 9.3  9.5 514.5
48.2 US$ bill.  141.5 US$ bill. 47.8 US$ bill. 7.4 US$ bill. 9.5 US$ bill. 62.2 US$ bill.
J. Reduction scenario on ODS: (90-80-70-60) USA 80% EU 90% Japan 80% Canada 70% Brazil 60% China 60% 
9.6 20% left  11.5 10% left 1,063.9 20% left 2.8 30% left 3.8 40% left 205.8 40% left
9.6 US$ bill.  14.1 US$ bill. 9.6 US$ bill. 2.2 US$ bill. 3.8 US$ bill. 24.9 US$ bill.
M. 2014 ODS 
M(a). Current Total AMS (recent and 2014) 
latest notification  14.4 2001; USA/51 39.3 2001; EEC/51 730.0 2002; JPN/108 0.8 2000; CAN/53 0.1 1997; BRA/18 0 not appl.
2014  7.7 Table 7  20.0 Table 7 730.0 =2002 0.8 =2000 0.1 =1997 0 not appl.
M(b). Blue box payments (recent and 2014) 
recent notification  0 2001; USA/51 22.2 2001; EEC/51 86.5 2002; JPN/108 0 2000; CAN/53 0 1997; BRA/18 0 assumed
2014  1.8 proj. (Table 7) 3.5 proj. (Table 7) 86.5 =2002 0 =2000 0 =1997 0 assumed
M(c). PS de minimis AMS (recent and 2014) (in 2014: below 2.5% for USA, EU, Japan, Canada; 5% for Brazil; 8.5% for China)
recent notification  0.2 2001; USA/51 0.5 2001; EEC/51 23.2 2002; JPN/108 0.2 2000; CAN/53 0.3 1997; BRA/18 0.9 1996-98
2014  0.3 Table 7  0.0 Table 7 23.2 =2002 0.2 =2000 0.3 =1997 0.9 =1996-98
M(d). NPS de minimis AMS (recent and 2014) (in 2014: below 2.5% for USA, EU, Japan, Canada; 5% for Brazil; 8.5% for China)
recent notification  6.8 2001; USA/51 0.5 2000; EEC/49 20.4 2002; JPN/108 1.2 2000; CAN/53 0.1 1997; BRA/18 29.4 1996-98
2014  2.1 Table 7  0.5 =2000 20.4 =2000 1.2 =2000 0.1 =1997 29.4 =1996-98
M(a+b+c+d) Overall distorting support ODS (recent and 2014)
recent notification  21.5  62.5 860.1 2.3  0.5 30.3
2014  11.8  24.1 860.1 2.3  0.5 30.3
2014  11.8 US$ bill.  29.6 US$ bill. 7.7 US$ bill. 1.8 US$ bill. 0.5 US$ bill. 3.7 US$ bill.
Brazil China USA  EU-15 Japan Canada
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Table 3. Base Data for MDS and Projecting 2014 MDS
A. Exchange rate  not appl.  0.8126 EUR/USD 111.273 JPY/USD 1.2587 CAD/USD not appl. 8.2768 CNY/USD
US$ bill.  € bill. ¥ bill. C$ bill.  US$ bill. RMB bill.
K. Base MDS (Maximum Distorting Support): TAMS commitment+blue entitlement+NPS  dm + 1/2PS dm 
Final Bound Total AMS  19.1  67.2 3,972.9 4.3  0.9 0.0
Blue box entitlement  9.7 5%VOP 00-02 23.1 pymnts2001-03 448.9 5%VOP 00-02 1.7 5%VOP 00-02 1.9 5%VOP 00-02 116.9 5%VOP 00-02
1/2 PS   dm   (ass. 2000-02)  4.9 5%  6.2 5% 224.4 5% 0.8 5%  1.9 10% 198.8 8.5%
NPS   dm   (ass.2000-02)  9.7 5%  12.3 5% 448.9 5% 1.7 5%  3.9 10% 198.8 8.5%
    Base MDS (sum above)  43.4  108.8 5,095.1 8.4  8.7 514.5
43.4 US$ bill.  133.9 US$ bill. 45.8 US$ bill. 6.7 US$ bill. 8.7 US$ bill. 62.2 US$ bill.
L. 2014 MDS 
2014 Total AMS commitment (scenario USA 80%; EU 90%; Japan 80%; Canada 70%; Brazil 60%; China 60%) 
3.8 20% left  6.7 10% left 794.6 20% left 1.3 30% left 0.4 40% left 0.0 not appl.
2014 Blue box element (5% of VOP 2000-02) 
9.7  12.3 448.9 1.7  1.9 116.9
PS   de minimis   allowance (2.5% of 1/2 VOP; Brazil 5% of 1/2 VOP; China 8.5% of VOP since no Current TAMS) 
2.8  3.2 93.5 0.5  1.2 222.6
NPS   de minimis   allowance (2.5% of VOP; Brazil 5% of VOP; China 8.5% of VOP)
5.7  6.5 187.0 0.9  2.3 222.6
    2014 MDS (sum above)  22.1  28.8 1,523.9 4.3  5.8 562.2
22.1 US$ bill.  35.4 US$ bill. 13.7 US$ bill. 3.4 US$ bill. 5.8 US$ bill. 67.9 US$ bill.
Brazil China USA  EU-15 Japan Canada  24
 
Table 4. Estimating U.S. Current Total AMS in 2004 and 2014
AMS  MPS  LDP&MLG Other  AMS MPS LDP&MLG Other  AMS  MPS LDP&MLG Other  AMS MPS LDP&MLG Other 
US$ mill.  US$ mill. US$ mill.  US$ mill. US$ mill. US$ mill.US$ mill. US$ mill. US$ mill.  US$ mill. US$ mill. US$ mill. US$ mill. US$ mill.US$ mill. US$ mill.
Apples  175.1  175.1
Barley  69.8  68.7 1.0 16.4 16.0 0.4 80.0  80.0 3.0 3.0
Beef and veal 
Corn  2,756.7  2,629.0 127.6 1,269.7 1,193.5 76.2 3,158.0  3,082.0 76.0 76.0 76.0
Cotton  1,049.8  565.9 483.9 2,810.1 2,541.0 269.1 2,092.0  1,823.0 269.0 269.0 269.0
Dairy  5,070.4  4,377.5  692.8 4,483.3 4,483.2 0.1 5,485.0 4,585.0 900.0 5,301.0 5,301.0 0.0
Hogs and pigs 
Honey  29.2  28.8 0.4 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Canola  82.3  71.7 10.6 23.0 22.8 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other minor oilseeds  191.3  156.0 35.3 66.8 66.8 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mohair  2.3  2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Oats  44.7  44.6 0.1 4.2 4.2 0.0 3.0  3.0 0.0 26.0 26.0 0.0
Peanuts  437.7  330.0  107.7 304.6 310.6 -6.0
Pulses 
  Rice  624.4  597.7 26.7 762.9 728.0 34.9 186.0  151.0 35.0 276.0 241.0 35.0
Sorghum  83.8  83.0 0.9 5.8 5.2 0.6 126.0  125.0 1.0 11.0 10.0 1.0
Soybeans  3,606.4  2,567.5 1,039.0 3,610.0 3,443.7 166.3 820.0  654.0 166.0 168.0 2.0 166.0
Sugar  1,177.5  1,132.8  44.6 1,061.0 1,031.7 29.2 1,157.0 1,128.0 29.0 1,248.0 1,219.0 29.0
Tobacco  519.1  519.1 -1.3 -1.3 0.0  290.0 290.0
Wheat  847.2  830.9 16.3 189.4 176.6 12.8 99.0  86.0 13.0 280.0 267.0 13.0
Other notified products  97.7  97.7 21.7 21.7 21.7  21.7 21.7 21.7
Sum of PS AMS  16,865.4  14,627.6 13,227.7  7,969.7
   Net of   de minimis   AMS 16,802.6  14,413.1 13,128.7  7,711.7
NPS AMS  7,278.0  6,828.2 6,014.0  2,072.0
    MLA&CCP  5,463.5 4,639.8 3,942.0 0.0
    Crop Insurance  1,395.8 1,770.4 1,666.0 1,666.0
    Other  418.8 418.0 406.0 406.0
PS AMS+NPS AMS  24,143.4  21,455.8 19,241.7  10,041.7
Current Total AMS  16,802.6  14,413.1 13,128.7  7,711.7
Sources: 
2000 and 2001: U.S. notification USA/51 
2004: estimated from USDA February 2004 Baseline, FAPRI 2003 Agricultural Outlook, OECD PSE database, and WASDE 12 January 2005 and FSA activity report 12 January 2005.
2014: estimated from USDA February 2004 Baseline; and tobacco: 2.9 bill. over ten years, starting in FY 2005.
Non-bold AMS amounts indicate de minimis AMS. Boxed cells indicate large decline from earlier year.
LDP&MLG: sum of commodity loan forfeit, marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments, and certificate exchange gains.
Other minor oilseeds (other than canola): sum of crambe, flaxseed, mustard seed, rapeseed, safflower, sesame, sunflower.
Other notified products: sum of Apricots, Cranberries, Onions, Peaches, Pears, Potatoes, Rye, Sheep & Lamb, Tomatoes, and Wool 
All other: all other products in U.S. agriculture and which are not listed in notifications.
Pulses: sum of small chickpeas, lentils,dry peas. 
2014 assumptions: CCP (Countercyclical payments) claimed as blue;  de minimis percentage 2.5%.
USA Current Total AMS 2004&2014 
2000 notified  2001 notified 2004 (est.)  2014 (est.) 
Table 5. Estimating EU-15 Current Total AMS in 2004 and 2014
AMS  AAP  ref price  quantity AMS AAP ref price quantity AMS AAP  ref price quantity AMS AAP ref price quantity
€ mill.  €/tonne  €/tonne  mill. t € mill. €/tonne €/tonne mill. t € mill. €/tonne  €/tonne mill. t € mill. €/tonne €/tonne mill. t
Common wheat  2,270.7  110.3         86.5  95.6 1,236.6 101.3      86.5 83.5 1,386.8 101.3 86.5 93.7 1,588.0 101.3 86.5 107.3
Durum wheat  0.0  110.3         148.5  8.9 0.0 101.3      148.5 8.1 0.0 101.3 148.5 9.4 0.0 101.3 148.5 10.6
C. wheat, maize, barley, rye, triticale, grain sorghum 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Barley  2,194.5  110.3         67.3  51.1 1,640.4 101.3      67.3 48.2 1,671.3 101.3 67.3 49.1 1,732.0 101.3 67.3 50.9
Maize  706.7  110.3         91.9  38.5 379.6 101.3      91.9 40.3 369.3 101.3 91.9 39.3 383.3 101.3 91.9 40.8
Rye  238.0  110.3         67.3  5.5 212.9 101.3      67.3 6.3 0.0 0.0
Oats  0.0  110.3         112.5  6.8 0.0 101.3      112.5 6.2 0.0 0.0
Sorghum  16.2  110.3         85.7  0.7 10.2 101.3      85.7 0.7 10.0 101.3 85.7 0.6 10.4 101.3 85.7 0.7
Triticale  210.1  110.3         67.3  4.9 179.4 101.3      67.3 5.3 161.4 101.3 67.3 4.8 167.6 101.3 67.3 4.9
    Sub-tot cereals  5,636.1  3,659.1 3,598.8  3,881.2
Rice  393.1  298.4         143.3  2.5 396.6 298.4      143.3 2.6 17.4 150 143.3 2.6 17.4 150 143.3 2.6
White Sugar  5,808.6  631.9         193.8  13.9 5,720.1 631.9      193.8 14.1 5,720.1 631.9 193.8 14.1 2,219.8 421 193.8 11.9
SMP  1,507.6  2,055.2         684.7  1.1 1,370.5 2,055.2     684.7 1.0 1,258.8 1952.4 684.7 1.0 785.0 1746.9 684.7 0.7
Butter  4,443.5  3,282.0         943.3  1.9 4,443.5 3,282.0     943.3 1.9 3,796.2 3052.3 943.3 1.8 2,585.0 2463.9 943.3 1.7
Beef  11,190.3  3,242.0         1730  7.4 9,707.2 3,013.0     1730 7.6 0.0 1,560.0 1730 7.4 0 1,560.0 1730 7.6
Milk  not applicable  0.0 payment (dm AMS) 0.0 payment (dm AMS) 0 payment (dm AMS)
Olive Oil  2,070.4  3837.7  2851.8  2.1 2,675.7 3837.7 2851.8 2.7 2,070.4 3837.7 2851.8 2.1 920.0 olive grove payment
Tobacco  963.9  951.6 premium payment 951.6 premium payment 0
Apples  2,248.9  2,059.5 EMS 2,059.5 EMS  2,059.5 EMS
Tomatoes  2,952.8  1,944.2 EMS 1,944.2 EMS  1,944.2 EMS
Wine  806.6  891.6 EMS 891.6 EMS  891.6 EMS
Cotton  795.0  575.1 EMS 575.1 EMS  0.0
Dried fodder  306.3  317.2 payment 317.2 payment  145.6 payment
All other  4,729.2  4,569.3 payments and EMS 4,569.3 payments and EMS 4,569.3 payments and EMS
Sum of PS AMS 43,852.2  39,281.3 27,770.2 20,018.7
   Net of dm AMS  43,852.2  39,281.3 23,956.6 20,001.3
NPS AMS  537.7 de minimis  573.5 de minimis 600.0 de minimis 600.0 de minimis
Current Tot AMS 43,852.2  39,281.3 23,956.6 20,001.3
Sources: 2000/01: EC notification EEC/49; 2001/02: EEC/51; 2004: estimated from changes under Agenda 2000 and 2003 CAP reform; 
2014: estimated from further changes under 2003 and 2004 CAP reform.  
2014 assumptions: de minimis percentage 2.5%. Note: boxed cells indicate particularly large decline. 
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Table 6. Major Elements of 2014 Current Total AMS (projection) for USA and EU-15 
USA ($ bill.)    EU-15 (€ bill.) 
    
Corn 0.0   Cereals  3.9
Cotton 0.3   Sugar    2.2
Dairy (market price support)  5.3   Skim milk powder  0.8
Peanuts 0.0   Butter  2.6
Rice 0.3   Beef  0.0
Soybeans 0.0   Olive  oil  0.9
Sugar 1.2   Apples  2.0
Tobacco 0.3   Tomatoes  1.9
Wheat 0.3   Wine  0.9
All other products  0.0   All other products   4.8
   Current Total AMS 2014  7.7      Current Total AMS 2014  20.0
    
Source: Tables 4 and 5.  
Table 7. Calculation of 2014 Support for USA and EU-15 
    USA ($ bill.)    EU-15 (€ bill.) 
row  Base Amounts   
1  Final Bound Total AMS 2000  19.1 67.2 =US$ bill. 82.6 
      
2  PS de minimis  9.7 5% of VOP 2000-02  12.3 5% of VOP 2000-02 
3  NPS de minimis  9.7 5% of VOP 2000-02  12.3 5% of VOP 2000-02 
4  Blue box   9.7 5% of VOP 2000-02  23.1 est. payment 2001-03 
5  Base Overall Distorting Support  
(sum of rows 1, 2, 3 and 4)  48.2   115.0 =US$ bill. 141.5 
    
  2014 Support   
6  2014 Current Total AMS   7.7 from Table 6  20.0 from Table 6 
  
7  2014 Blue payments   1.8 projected CCP 3.5 projection  (see  note) 
8  2014 PS de minimis used   0.3 0.3 same as 2001/02  
9  2014 NPS de minimis used   2.1 0.5 same as 2001/02 
10  2014 Current ODS (= End ODS)  11.9 sum of rows 6, 7, 8,9     24.3  sum of rows 6, 7, 8, 9  
    
   Possible cuts       
11  (2014 Current Total AMS)/ 
(Base TAMS commitment)   40% row 6/row 1  30% row 6/row 1 
12         Possible Total AMS cut  60% 100% less row 11  70% 100% less row 11 
13  (2014 Current ODS)/ 
(Base Overall Distorting Support)   25% row 10/row 5  21% row 10/row 5 
14         Possible Overall Reduction  75% 100% less row 13  89% 100% less row 13 
 
Source: See Annex B and Tables 4 and 5. 
Note: Row 1: Table 8. Rows 2, 3, and 4: see Annex B and Table 1. Row 6: Table 6. Rows 8 and 9: See Annex B and Table 2. Row 7: for  
USA: estimated 2014 Counter-Cyclical Payments, based on USDA February 2004 baseline; for EU-15: assuming 2014 total direct payments 
(other than blue) are €31 bill. and blue payments account for 10% of total direct payments (including blue), yields blue payments of €3.5 bill. Table 8.  Calculating the 2014 Cap on Overall Distorting Support (ODS): 90-80-70-60 Harmonizing Tiers 
 USA  EU-15  Japan  Canada  Brazil  China 
   
Base ODS (bill.)  $48  €115  ¥5,310  C$9  $11  RMB 515 
  in US$ bill.  $48  $142  $48  $7  $11  $62 
           
Cut  by  80% 90% 80%  70%  60%  60% 
           
2014 ODS cap (bill.)  $9.6  €11.5  ¥1,062  C$2.8  $4.3  RMB 206 
  in US$ bill.  $10  $14  $10  $2  $4  $25 
           
Note: Base ODS is sum of Final Bound Total AMS, permitted de minimis level, and blue box entitlement. 2014 ODS cap is the commitment on  
ODS after the 90-80-70-60 cut. 
Sources: Table 2. 
Final Bound Total AMS: Table 1 and Table 9. Permitted de minimis level: 5+5=10% of value of production (USA, EU, Japan, Canada), 10+10=20% (Brazil), 
8.5+8.5=17% (China). Details in Table 1. 
Blue box entitlement: 5% of value of production (EU: estimated blue payments in 2001-03). Details in Table 1. 




Table 9.  Calculating the 2014 Cap on Total AMS (TAMS): 90-80-70-60 Harmonizing Tiers 
 USA  EU-15  Japan  Canada  Brazil  China 
   
Base TAMS (bill.)  $19  €67  ¥3,973  C$4  $1  0 
   in US$ bill.  $19  $83  $36  $3  $1  0 
           
Cut  by  80% 90% 80%  70%  60%  not  applicable 
           
2014 TAMS cap (bill.)  $3.8 €6.7 ¥795  C$1.3 $0.4  0 
   in US$ bill.  $3.8  $8.3  $7.1  $1.0  $0.4  0 
           
Note: Base TAMS is Final Bound Total AMS commitment in 2000 (USA, EU-15, Japan, and Canada) or 2004 (Brazil). 2014 TAMS cap is the  
commitment on Total AMS after the 90-80-70-60 cut. 
Sources: Table 1 ( from Members’ Schedules, Part IV, Section I) 
Exchange rates: See Annex A and Table 1. 
  
Table 10.  2014 Support Projections as Percentage of Base Total AMS and Base ODS 
   USA EU Japan Canada  Brazil China
            
2014 Current Total AMS   bill.  $7.7 €20.0 ¥730 C$0.8  $0.1 0
      
2014 Blue payments   bill.  $1.8 €3.5 ¥87 0  0 0
    
2014 PS de minimis used   bill.  $0.3 €0.3 ¥23 C$0.2  $0.3 RMB   0.9
2014 NPS de minimis used   bill.  $2.1 €0.5 ¥20 C$1.2  $0.1 RMB 29.4
    
2014 Current ODS  
(sum of above)  
bill. $11.9 €24.3 ¥860 C$2.3  $0.5 RMB  30.3
            
2014 Current Total AMS/ 
Base TAMS 
% 40% 30% 18% 20%  9% not  applicable
    
2014 Current ODS/ 
Base ODS 
% 25% 21% 16% 25%  5% 6%
Sources: Support projections for USA and EU: See Annex B and Table 7. Support projections for other Members: support in a recent  
notification is assumed to continue unchanged in 2014 (details in Tables 1 and 2). Recent notifications: Japan: G/AG/N/JPN/108; Canada:  
G/AG/N/CAN/53; G/AG/N/BRA/18; China: supporting tables for accession in WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3.Table 11. Changes in Entitlements to Distorting Support under 90-80-70-60 Scenario (US$ bill.) 
      USA EU-15 Japan Canada Brazil China Total  (six 
countries)
ODS and MDS: Base and 2014 
a  Base ODS (Table 8)  48 142 48 7 10 62 316
b  Base MDS (details in Table 3)  43 134 46 7 9 62 301
c  2014 commitment on ODS (Table 8)  10 14 10 2 4 25 65
d  2014 MDS (details in Table 3)  22 35 14 3 6 68 148
 
Changes in ODS and MDS 
e = a – c Base ODS –2014 commitment on ODS  39 127 38 5 5 37 252
f = - e/a  % change (as per scenario assumption)  -80% -90% -80% -70% -60% -60% -80%
g = b – d Base MDS – 2014 MDS  21 99 32 3 3 -6 152
h = - g/b % change in MDS  -49% -74% -70% -49% -33% 9% -51%
i = d – c Further reduction from Base MDS, resulting 
from ODS commitment 
13 21 4 1 2 43 84
j = i/b  % change  -29% -16% -9% -18% -17% -69% -28%
  
Note: Calculated from unrounded data. 
ODS: Overall Distorting Support (see text). Calculated in accordance with 2004 Framework provisions for Overall Reduction. 
 
MDS: Maximum Distorting Support (see text). Recognizes that a PS AMS cannot at the same time be de minimis and part of Current Total AMS. 
 
Base MDS = UR Final Bound Total AMS commitment + blue entitlement (5% of 2000-02 VOP) + NPS de minimis allowance (percentage of 2000-02  
VOP) + PS de minimis allowances on products accounting for an arbitrary 50% (100% for China) of sector’s VOP in 2000-02. De minimis  
percentages: USA, EU, Japan, Canada: 5%, Brazil 10%, China 8.5%. 
 
2014 MDS  = Final Bound Total AMS (after DDA reductions) + blue entitlement (5% of 2000-02 VOP) + NPS de minimis allowance (percentage 
of VOP in 2014) + PS de minimis allowances on products accounting for an arbitrary 50% (100% for China) of sector’s VOP in 2014. De minimis  
percentages: USA, EU, Japan, Canada: 2.5%, Brazil 5%, China 8.5%. 
 
China’s 2014 MDS (row d) is larger than the Base MDS (row b). The MDS increases by $6 bill. because China has no Total AMS to reduce, the blue box 
entitlement stays fixed, and the de minimis percentage is assumed to remain fixed at 8.5% (assuming that almost all of China’s de minimis support is 
allocated to subsistence and resource-poor farmers). The assumed 12% increase in 2014 value of production increases the de minimis component of MDS. 